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INTRODUCTION 
Independent contractors constitute a large number of the 
American workforce.1  However, the misclassification of 
employees as independent contractors is a large problem 
affecting our nation.2  Although state and federal jurisdictions 
have passed statutes to prevent the intentional and accidental 
misclassification of employees, the issue is still prevalent.3  
Misclassified workers are deprived of many protections, such 
as workers compensation, unemployment benefits, earned 
vacation time, pensions, and sick leave.4  Furthermore, 
misclassified workers fall outside of the protection of most if 
not all wage and hour laws designed to protect employees.5 
From an employer’s perspective, there are many 
incentives to classify workers as independent contractors.6  For 
example, employers can dodge various financial and legal 
obligations by hiring independent contractors.7  The financial 
savings alone would appeal to most people as a sensible and 
business savvy decision.  However, the constant change in law 
regarding who is considered an employee versus who is 
considered an independent contractor has created confusion 
for employers, workers, legislatures, and the judicial system.8 
California’s latest case to weigh in on this issue comes 
from the Second District Court of Appeal in Dynamex.9  In that 
 
 1.  Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/conemp.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 
2015). 
 2.  Francois Carre & Randall Wilson, The Social and Economic Costs of 
Employee Misclassification in Construction (Dec. 17, 2004). 
 3.  See Christopher Buscaglia, Crafting a Legislative Solution to the 
Economic Harm of Employee Misclassification, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 111, 112 
(Spring 2009) (discussing the prevalence of employee misclassification). 
 4.  See Carre, supra note 2, at 9. 
 5.  See Carre, supra note 2, at 9. 
 6.  See Carre, supra note 2, at 8–9. 
 7.  See Carre, supra note 2, at 8–9. 
 8.  See infra Part II. 
 9.  Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. App. 4th 718, 
review granted January 28, 2015, S222732. (Ct. App. 2014). 
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case, the Second District unanimously agreed that the 
plaintiffs of the case correctly relied upon the definition of 
“employee” as found in California’s Industrial Welfare 
Commission (IWC) wage order to determine who could be 
included in a class action lawsuit against the defendant.10  The 
Dynamex court based its decision upon the ruling in Martinez 
v. Combs, a California Supreme Court case that used the IWC’s 
wage order to define who is an “employee.”11  The Martinez 
definition included three alternative and mutually exclusive 
definitions for employee: “(a) to exercise control over the wages, 
hours or working conditions, or (b) to suffer or permit to work, 
or (c) to engage, thereby creating a common law employment 
relationship.”12  On January 28, 2015, the California Supreme 
Court granted review of the case. 
The Dynamex defendants, however, argued that the 
correct definition of employee should be founded on previous 
common law principles, specifically the “right to control” test 
set forth by the California Supreme Court in S.G. Borello & 
Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (Borello).13  
Borello’s “right to control” test looks at whether an employer 
has the right to assert control over “the manner and means of 
accomplishing the results desired.”14  Additionally, the 
California Supreme Court added several other factors for 
consideration; such as the specific type of occupation engaged 
in and the length of time services are to be performed.15 
The Dynamex decision has created a sudden influx of class 
action lawsuits regarding the new test to determine 
independent contractor status.16  However, the California 
Supreme Court recently granted review of Dynamex on 
 
 10.  Id. at 722. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 728 (emphasis added). 
 13.  Id. at 729. 
 14.  S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404 
(Cal. 1989). 
 15.  Id. at 404. 
 16.  See, e.g., Jonathan A. Siegel, Controversial Dynamex Case Regarding 
Misclassification of Independent Contractors to be Reviewed by California 
Supreme Court, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.natlawreview
.com/article/controversial-dynamex-case-regarding-misclassification-
independent-contractors-to-be; Jessica Perry and Lauri Damrell, Think Your 
Workers are Independent Contractors? Not So Fast Says DOL, EMP. L. & LITIG. 
BLOG (Oct. 16, 2015), http://blogs.orrick.com/employment/tag/dynamex-
operations-west-v-superior-court/. 
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January 28, 2015.17 
This Comment will analyze the two opposing viewpoints 
and introduce new considerations and solutions to fix 
misclassification problems.  To determine which definition of 
“employee” should be used, California courts should look at the 
history of employee classification and the benefits and 
downfalls of choosing one definition over the other. 
Part I of this Comment will look at the history of 
California’s attempts to address employer/employee 
relationships both legislatively and judicially.18  Part II will 
identify the legal issues surrounding this topic.19  Part III will 
analyze California’s two present tests for determining the 
employment relationship.20  Lastly, Part IV will propose a new 
test that can best encompass the many different types of 
employment arrangements in California.21 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Misclassification of Employees as Independent 
Contractors 
The misclassification of employees is a serious and 
widespread issue not only in California, but also across the 
nation.22 It is important to understand why employers would 
rather have independent contractors rather than employees.  
Employers typically use independent contractors to reduce 
their overhead costs.23  When dealing with independent 
contractors, employers do not have to follow some of the wage, 
hour, and working condition laws that normally protect 
regular employees.24  Furthermore, independent contractors 
 
 17.  Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 341 P.3d 438 (2015). 
 18.  See infra Part I. 
 19.  See infra Part II. 
 20.  See infra Part III. 
 21.  See infra Part IV. 
 22.  U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-717, Employee 
Misclassification Improved Coordination, Outreach, and Targeting Could Better 
Ensure Detection and Prevention, at 12 (2009)  (providing statistics regarding 
the number of employees who are misclassified as independent contractors and 
the financial effect of the misclassification). 
 23.  Michael Carlin, Discrimination Against Disabled Contractors Under the 
Rehabilitation Act, 34 WHITTIER L. REV. 283, 285 (Spring 2013) (discussing the 
reasons why employers like hiring independent contractors). 
 24.  See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at 112 (discussing the harm suffered by 
misclassification of employees). 
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are not protected by workers compensation, receive no benefits, 
and are not protected by anti-discrimination laws.25 
Employers may save by classifying their workers as 
independent contractors, but in doing so they harm the worker, 
the state, and the economy.26 State governments are denied 
potential income tax revenues because employers do not 
withhold state and federal taxes from independent 
contractors.27  Additionally, independent contractors are 
known to under-report income on their 1099 income tax 
forms.28  Furthermore, employers are more willing to 
misclassify their workers to save on worker compensation 
premiums, which is typically based upon the number of actual 
employees the employer has.29 
Competitively, employers who misclassify their workers 
gain an economic advantage over other employers who 
properly classify their workers.30  Employers who properly 
classify their workers pay for benefits, workers compensation 
insurance, and the costs of materials and equipment.31  
Employers who do not have to bear these costs can undercut 
their competitors by providing cheaper services and/or goods.32  
Thus, in order to remain competitive, an employer may feel 
compelled to cut corners and misclassify their workers. 
Fault does not rest solely on employers however.  Many 
workers wish to be independent contractors for specific non-
employment benefits.33 Less than one in ten independent 
contractor would prefer a more “regular” nine-to-five type of 
work arrangement.34  One of the largest reasons why 
independent contractors choose to keep their status is to 
underreport their true earnings and avoid taxes.35  To avoid 
 
 25.  See Carlin, supra note 23, at 286 (discussing the lack of protections for 
misclassified employees.) 
 26.  See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at 112 (discussing the personal and economic 
impact of employee misclassification). 
 27.  See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at 112. 
 28.  See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at 112. 
 29.  See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at 116. 
 30.  See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at 116. 
 31.  See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at 116. 
 32.  See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at 116 (discussing the advantages received 
by employers who misclassify their workers). 
 33. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 1, at 4. 
 34. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 1, at 4. 
 35. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-717, Employee Misclassification 
Improved Coordination, Outreach, and Targeting Could Better Ensure Detection 
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these types of issues, California, other states, and the federal 
government have designed many laws, which often conflict 
with one another, to distinguish an employee from an 
independent contractor.36 
B. The Common Law Definition of Employee under 
Borello 
Borello states California’s interpretation of the common 
law test for distinguishing an employee from an independent 
contractor.37 In Borello, the California Labor Commission 
penalized a Gilroy grower, S.G. Borello and Sons, for failure to 
secure workers’ compensation coverage for their 50 migrant 
harvesters.38 
Under the California Workers’ Compensation Act, all 
employers are required to provide workers’ compensation 
coverage.39  The Act only covers injuries suffered by an 
employee, which arises out of and in the course of an 
individual’s employment.40  Independent contractors are not 
protected by the Act because they are not considered 
employees.41  In Borello, the defendants argued that they were 
not required to have workers’ compensation coverage because 
their harvesters were “share farmers.”42  In their opinion, 
share farmers were independent contractors, not employees.43  
The defendants provided the plaintiffs share farmers with a 
plot of land that had already been prepared and cultivated.44  
The share farmers then harvested the crop on their assigned 
plot of land and the manner and tools they used to accomplish 
this task was left entirely to their discretion.45 
However, the Borello court ruled in favor of the share 
farmers, and concluded the most important factor in 
 
and Prevention, at 10-11 (2009). 
 36.  See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at Appendix (displaying all states and their 
statutes enforcing misclassification laws). 
 37.  Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. App. 4th 718, 
722. 
 38.  S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 401. 
 39.  Cal. Lab. Code §§ 3600(a), 3700(b) (2014). 
 40.  Borello, 769 P.2d  at 403. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at 400. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 401. 
 45.  Id. 
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determining the difference between an employee and an 
independent contractor was whether the employer had the 
“right to control” the manner in which the work was 
completed.46  The Borello court looked towards the California 
Labor Codes to help define “employee.”  Under the Code, and 
employee was considered to be most persons “in the service of 
an employer under any appointment or contract of hire . . . 
express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or 
unlawfully employed . . .”47  Additionally, the Codes defined an 
“independent contractor” as “any person who renders service 
for a specified recompense for a specified result, under the 
control of his principal as to the result of his work only and not 
as to the means by which such result is accomplished.”48  
Ultimately, the court sided with common law tradition and 
focused on the “control” aspect of the employment 
relationship.49 
In addition to the control test, the Borello court 
acknowledged that the test could not be dispositive in 
determining the employment relationship, even if it is the most 
important factor.50  The court recognized that there were many 
types of work arrangements and that not all fit perfectly into 
the definitions of employee or independent contractor.51  The 
rigid application of the “control” test on its own was not very 
helpful in distinguishing these variable and borderline 
situations.52  Thus, the court endorsed several “ ‘ secondary 
indicia’ of the nature of the service relationship.”53 
Of all the secondary indicia, the Borello court indicated 
that an employer’s ability to discharge workers at will and 
without cause strongly evidenced an employment 
relationship.54 The court then provided eight additional factors 
 
 46.  Borello, 769 P.2d at 404. 
 47.  Cal. Lab. Code § 3351 (2014). 
 48.  Cal. Lab. Code § 3353 (2014). 
 49.  Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Board, 417 P.2d 975, 977 (1970) 
(discussing the level of control an employer had in an unemployment insurance 
hearing); see also, e.g., Isenberg v. Cal. Emp’t Stabilization Com., 180 P.2d 11, 15 
(1947) (same; drawing direct analogy to workers’ compensation 
law); Perguica v. Indus. Acci. Com., 29 Cal.2d 857, 859–61 (1947) (discussing 
workers’ compensation). 
 50.  Borello, 769 P.2d at 404. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
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to consider from the Restatement Second of Agency and from 
the Fair Labor Standards Act: 
. . . (2) whether the one performing services is engaged in a 
distinct occupation or business; (3) the kind of occupation, 
with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is 
usually done under the direction of the principal or by a 
specialist without supervision; (4) the skill required in the 
particular occupation; (5) whether the principal or the 
worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place 
of work for the person doing the work; (6) the length of time 
for which the services are to be performed; (7) the method 
of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (8) whether 
or not the work is a part of the regular business of the 
principal; (9) whether or not the parties believe they are 
creating an employer-employee relationship; (10) whether 
the classification of independent contractor is bona fide and 
not a subterfuge to avoid employee status; (11) the hiree’s 
degree of investment other than personal service in his or 
her own business and whether the hiree holds himself or 
herself out to be in business with an independent business 
license; (12) whether the hiree has employees; (13) the 
hiree’s opportunity for profit or loss depending on his or her 
managerial skill; and (14) whether the service rendered is 
an integral part of the alleged employer’s business.55 
The court noted that similar to the control test, these 
factors should not be mechanically applied individually.56  
These factors and tests should be considered “intertwined” and 
the weight of each factor or combination of factors would 
depend upon the specific circumstances of each case.57 
After considering the many factors, the court held that the 
share farmers were employees because the defendants 
maintained “pervasive control” over the entire operation.58  In 
particular, the court noted that the defendants chose the crops 
to be planted, obtained a buyer for the crops, cultivated the 
land throughout the growing cycle, and transported the final 
product to the market.59  The court did acknowledge the 
defendant’s arguments that the farmers had control over how 
they harvested the crop and had to provide their own tools for 
 
 55.  Id. at 404, 407. 
 56.  Borello, 769 P.2d at 351. 
 57.  Id. at 404, 407. 
 58.  Id. at 408. 
 59.  Id. 
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the harvesting.60  However, the court noted that the farmer’s 
ability to control how they harvested the crop did not really 
matter because there was only one correct way for the farmers 
to do so.61  Additionally, the court felt that the level of manual 
labor exerted by the farmers was simple and did not require 
any particular level of expertise to accomplish it.62  Whereas 
independent contractors may have some level of expertise in a 
field, such as a plumber or an electrician, the court stated that 
the harvesting of crops was considered too simple and involved 
“no peculiar skill beyond that expected of any employee.”63 
C. The Federal Definition of Employee 
State courts could look to their federal counterparts for 
assistance in determining what constitutes an employee.  The 
federal courts have been asked many times to construe the 
meaning of “employee” because the statutes that define it offer 
very little assistance in its interpretation.64  The Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 defines “employee” as one “employed” by 
an employer.65  Additionally, the term “employer” means “any 
person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an 
employer in relation to an employee . . . .”66  Furthermore, 
employ means to “suffer or permit to work.”67 
To interpret the meaning of these words, the federal courts 
use the “economic realities” test.68  The economic realities test 
looks to see whether the worker is truly dependent upon the 
business he or she is employed at.69  If the employee is not 
dependent upon the employer, then the economic reality of the 
situation is that the worker is in the business solely for himself 
or herself.70 
 
 60.  Id at 409 
 61.  Id. at 408. 
 62.  Borello, 769 P.2d at 408. 
 63.  Id. 
 64. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992). 
 65. 29 U.S.C.S. § 203(e)(1) (2012). 
 66. 29 U.S.C.S. § 203(d) (2012). 
 67. 29 U.S.C.S. § 203(g) (2012). 
 68. 29 U.S.C.S. § 201 et seq.; see Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 
U.S. 28, 33 (1961). 
 69.  See Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 32–33 (analyzing the factors of the economic 
realities test to determine the employment relationship). 
 70.  Id. 
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D. The California Industrial Wage Commission 
The California Legislature created the Industrial Wage 
Commission (IWC) in 1913.71  The IWC was delegated the 
power to regulate hours, wages, and conditions of labor and 
employment “in the various occupations, trades, and 
industries” in which women and minors are employed in 
California.72  The legislature bestowed the IWC with broad 
investigatory powers to accomplish that task.73  The IWC was 
given free access to businesses and work environments, the 
authority to demand sworn reports and information, the ability 
to inspect records, and the ability to issue subpoenas requiring 
the appearance and testimony of witnesses under oath.74  If the 
IWC determined that women and minors in any industry were 
paid inadequate wages, forced to work unhealthy amounts of 
hours, or subject to harmful working conditions, the IWC was 
allowed to convene a “wage board” of employers and 
employees.75  After a meeting of this wage board and 
supplemental public hearing, the IWC would issue wage orders 
fixing industry wide minimum wage for women and minors, 
the maximum hours of work, and the industry standard for 
labor conditions.76 
Today, the IWC continues to have the same powers and 
duties it had over a century ago, but with additional bite.77  
First, the IWC now has “legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers.”78  Second, the IWC’s jurisdiction now includes all 
male employees, not just women and minors.79  California’s 
legislature expanded the IWC’s authority in response to the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which barred 
employment discrimination because of sex.80  Third, the IWC’s 
 
 71.  Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 54 (2010). 
 72.  Cal. Stats. 1913, ch. 324, § 3, subd.(a), p. 633. 
 73.  Cal. Stats. 1913, ch. 324, § 3 subd.(b), pars. 1–2, p. 633. 
 74.  Cal. Stats. 1913, ch. 324, § 3, subd.(b), par. 2, p. 633; Cal. Stats. 1913, ch. 
324, § 4, pp. 633–34. 
 75.  Cal. Stats. 1913, ch. 324, § 5, p. 634. 
 76.  Cal. Stats. 1913, ch. 324, § 6, subd. (a), pars. 2–3, pp. 634–35. 
 77.  See, e.g., §§ 1173 (duties of the IWC); 1174–74.5 (IWC authority to obtain 
records and conduct inspections); 1176 (authority to subpoena witnesses); 1178–
80 (authority to convene wage boards); 1181 (obligation to hold public hearings); 
1182 (authority to issue wage orders). 
 78.  Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 1. 
 79.  Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 55 (referencing Cal. Stats. 1973, ch. 
1007, § 8, 2335; Cal. Stats. 1972, ch. 1122, § 13, 2293). 
 80.  Id. (referencing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. § 
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responsibilities were expanded to be even broader.81  The IWC 
now had the “continuing duty” to assess wages, hours, and 
labor conditions of “all employees in this state,” not just specific 
industries where minimum wage laws had previously been 
problematic.82 
1. The California Industrial Wage Commission’s 
Wage Orders 
Presently, there are eighteen different wage orders in 
effect in California.83  These wage orders include coverage of 
the following industries: manufacturing;84 personal services;85 
canning, freezing and preserving;86 professional, technical, 
clerical, mechanical, and similar occupations;87 public 
housekeeping;88 laundry, linen supply and dry cleaning and 
dyeing;89 mercantile;90 post harvest handling;91 
transportation;92 amusement and recreation;93 broadcasting;94 
motion picture;95 preparation of agricultural products for the 
market;96 agricultural occupations;97 household occupations;98 
and on-site occupations.99  One wage order covers 
“miscellaneous employees,” which includes “any industry or 
occupation” not previously covered by any other wage order.100  
A general wage order institutes a minimum wage.101  In each 
wage order, “employee” is defined as “any person employed by 
 
2000e et seq.). 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 57. 
 84.  8 C.C.R. § 11010 (2014). 
 85.  8 C.C.R. § 11020 (2014). 
 86.  8 C.C.R. § 11030 (2014). 
 87.  8 C.C.R. § 11040 (2014). 
 88.  8 C.C.R. § 11050 (2014). 
 89.  8 C.C.R. § 11060 (2014). 
 90.  8 C.C.R. § 11070 (2014). 
 91.  8 C.C.R. § 11080 (2014). 
 92.  8 C.C.R. § 11090 (2014). 
 93.  8 C.C.R. § 11100 (2014). 
 94.  8 C.C.R. § 11110 (2014). 
 95.  8 C.C.R. § 11120 (2014). 
 96.  8 C.C.R. § 11130 (2014). 
 97.  8 C.C.R. § 11140 (2014). 
 98.  8 C.C.R. § 11150 (2014). 
 99.  8 C.C.R. § 11160 (2014). 
 100.  8 C.C.R. § 11170 (2014). 
 101.  8 C.C.R. § 11000 (2014). 
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an employer.”102  Additionally, each wage order defines an 
“employer” as any person “who directly or indirectly . . . 
employs or exercises control over the wages, hours, or working 
conditions of any person.”103  Furthermore, “employ” under the 
wages orders means to “engage, suffer, or permit to work.”104 
2. Enforcement of the California Industrial Wage 
Commission’s Wage Orders 
To enforce the IWC’s wage orders, the California 
Legislature included criminal, civil, and administrative 
penalties to all employers who failed to meet the commission’s 
standards.105  Any employer or individual acting as an officer, 
agent, or employee of another who violates any provision of the 
California Labor Code or any IWC wage order shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $100 or by 
imprisonment for not less than 30 days, or both.106  An 
employer who knowingly and willfully misclassify an 
individual as an independent contractor is subject to a civil 
penalty of not less than five thousand dollars and not more 
than fifteen thousand dollars for each violation.107  Those 
engaged in a pattern of these violations will be subject to 
increased fines between ten thousand and twenty-five 
thousand dollars per violation.108  Employers who fail to pay 
adequate wages may be subject to civil action for the recovery 
of unpaid wages, including waiting time penalties and 
liquidated damages.109  Furthermore, the employer will be 
publicly shamed: they are required to display their violation 
and the actions they have taken to rectify them in a prominent 
place accessible and viewable by all employees and the general 
public.110 
E. The Dynamex Decision 
In Dynamex, plaintiffs brought a class action suit against 
 
 102.  See, e.g., 8 C.C.R. § 11010(2)(E) (2014). 
 103.  See, e.g., 8 C.C.R. § 11010(2)(F) (2014). 
 104.  See, e.g., 8 C.C.R. § 11010(2)(D) (2014). 
 105.  Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 56. 
 106.  Cal. Lab. Code § 1199 (2014). 
 107.  Cal. Lab. Code § 226.8(b) (2014). 
 108.  Cal. Lab. Code § 226.8(c) (2014). 
 109.  See e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 1193.6 (2014); Cal. Lab. Code § 1194 (2014); 
Cal. Lab. Code § 1194.2 (2014) (setting penalties for misclassifying employees). 
 110.  Cal. Lab. Code § 226.8(e) (2014). 
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Dynamex on behalf of 1,800 delivery drivers.111  The plaintiffs 
in Dynamex had all been re-classified as independent 
contractors.112  Prior to the reclassification, they were all 
employees subject to California wage and hour laws.113  The 
trial court certified the class of drivers, but Dynamex moved to 
decertify the class.114  Dynamex argued that the trial court 
incorrectly used the IWC definition of employee.115  If the court 
had instead used the Borello common law test of distinguishing 
employees from independent contractors, the class would have 
been decertified.116  The Second Appellate District held in favor 
of the plaintiffs,117 relying upon two prior California Supreme 
Court cases to reach its conclusion: Martinez v. Combs and 
Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc.118 
1. Martinez v. Combs 
In Martinez, seasonal agricultural workers brought an 
action against a strawberry farming company and two produce 
merchants who the farming company sold their product to for 
failure to pay minimum wages under California Labor Code 
Section 1194.119  Section 1194 was enacted in 1913 along with 
the creation of the California Industrial Welfare 
Commission.120  The workers of this case had been working 
without pay because the farming company had encountered 
financial problems.121  They eventually stopped working.122  A 
representative from one of the produce merchants came to the 
fields to assist the farming company in convincing the workers 
to return to work.123  Most did not return to work, and the 
workers eventually filed a suit for unpaid wages.124  The 
 
 111.  Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. App. 4th 718, 
721. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 721–22. 
 115.  Id. at 722. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Dynamex, Cal. App. 4th at 722. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 42. 
 120.  Cal. Stats. 1913, ch. 324, § 13, p. 637 (1913 uncodified Cal. act creating 
the IWC). 
 121.  Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 46–48. 
 122.  Id. at 46. 
 123.  Id. at 47. 
 124.  Id. at 47–48. 
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produce merchants filed for summary judgment, arguing that 
they did not directly employ the workers and should not be held 
liable.125  The agricultural workers argued that the produce 
merchants and the farming company jointly employed them 
under the definitions of “employ” and “employer” in Industrial 
Wage Order Number 14.126  The case eventually ended up in 
the California Supreme Court, who unanimously concluded 
that the merchant-defendants did not employ the plaintiffs.127 
The Martinez court stated that the definition of “employ” 
under the IWC wage orders does not require a “master and 
servant relationship.”128  Instead, the IWC uses the phrase 
“engage, suffer, or permit to work.”129  This was a widely used 
standard at the time, and would reach irregular working 
arrangements an employer might create in order to avoid 
labeling a worker as an employee.130  The court then took the 
common law “right to control” test and included it as an 
alternative to the IWC wage order definition.131  The court then 
finally concluded that the IWC’s definition of “employ” could 
mean one of three mutually exclusive definitions.132  First, 
employ could mean “to exercise control over the wages, hours, 
or working conditions.”133  Second, employ could mean to 
“suffer or permit to work.”134  This meant that an employer 
knew or should have known that an individual was working for 
them.135  Finally, employ could also mean to “engage, thereby 
creating a common law employment relationship.”136  The court 
recognized the importance of the “IWC control” test over the 
wages, hours, or working conditions, but felt that the sole 
application of the test without more would “substantially 
impair the commission’s authority” and render the wage order 
definitions meaningless.137 
 
 125.  Id. at 48. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  See Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 78. 
 128.  Id. at 57–58. 
 129.  See e.g., 8 C.C.R. §§ 11010, 11020. 
 130.  Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 58. 
 131.  Id. at 64. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575, 585 (2000). 
 136.  Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 64. 
 137.  Id. at 65. 
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The court applied this three-alternative-test and focused 
on whether the merchants had any “control” over the workers’ 
wages, hours, or working conditions.138  The court concluded 
that the merchants did not employ the workers through the 
farming company, because the company was not employed by 
the merchants to harvest strawberries.139  The farming 
company held itself out as a seller of strawberries, not as a 
management company that supervised farm workers.140  
Therefore, the merchants did not “employ” anyone because 
there was no level of supervision or control over the company 
or the workers.141 
2. Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court 
Following Martinez, Brinker reinforced the IWC’s broad 
authority to regulate wages, hours, and working conditions.142  
The Brinker court also stated that wage and hour claims were 
governed by “two complementary and occasionally overlapping 
sources of authority: the provisions of the Labor Code, enacted 
by the Legislature” and the wage orders issued by the IWC.143  
The court further emphasized the importance of the wage 
orders, stating that they were to be entitled to “extraordinary 
deference” and had to be “accorded the same dignity as 
statutes,” with “ ‘ independent effect’ separate and apart from 
any statutory enactments.”144  If a wage order and a labor code 
were to overlap with one another, the two must be 
“harmonized” to provide greater protections to workers.145 
3. Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc. 
In Ayala, a group of newspaper circulation carriers sued 
the Antelope Valley Press for misclassifying them as 
independent contractors and other wage order violations, 
including IWC wage order number 1-2001.146  The Ayala court 
encountered the same type of issue that occurred in Dynamex, 
 
 138.  See id. at 71–77 (analyzing the facts of the case under the three-
alternative-test). 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 73. 
 141.  Id. at 76. 
 142.  Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1026 (2012). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 1027  (quoting Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 61, 68). 
 145.  Id. at 1027. 
 146.  Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 522 (2014). 
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i.e., whether a group of plaintiffs could proceed as a putative 
class because they were all employees misclassified as 
independent contractors.147  The plaintiffs could only proceed 
as a putative class if they were considered employees.148  The 
plaintiffs argued that they were employees under the common 
law “right to control” test in Borello.149 
Here, the Ayala court had the opportunity to apply either 
the Borello test or the IWC wage order test to determine if the 
carriers were employees or independent contractors.150  The 
court chose not to analyze which test would govern, and left 
that question for “another day.”151  Instead the court chose to 
use the common law because the plaintiffs proceeded solely on 
the basis of the Borello test.152 
II. IDENTIFICATION OF LEGAL PROBLEM 
After Martinez, two separate tests exist to determine 
whether an individual is an employee or an independent 
contractor.153  The California Supreme Court has declined to 
state which test should be used to determine employee 
status.154  Is it the traditional common law Borello test that 
looks at whether an employer exercises control over the 
manner and means of accomplishing the result desired?155  Or 
is it the Martinez/IWC test which looks at three alternatives: 
(1) to exercise control over the wages, hours or working 
conditions; (2) to suffer or permit to work; or (3) to engage, 
thereby creating a common law employment relationship? 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Borello and Martinez/IWC tests have similar 
characteristics. Importantly, the two different tests contain a 
“control” portion.  These two “control” tests could mistakenly 
be confused to be the same test.  The reality is that they are in 
fact, two separate tests.  To clarify, the Borello test looks at 
 
 147.  Id. at 529. 
 148.  Id. at 530. 
 149.  Id. at 531. 
 150.  Id. at 530–31. 
 151.  Id. at 531. 
 152.  Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 531. 
 153.  See supra Parts I.B, I.E.1. 
 154.  Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 531. 
 155.  See supra Part I.B. 
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how work is to be done in order to reach the end goal.  For 
example, a plumber who is an independent contractor of a 
plumbing services company can set his or her own hours and 
make the necessary repairs and modifications to a client’s 
plumbing network as the plumber sees fit.  This plumber has 
control over the way he or she completes the job without 
following an employer’s direction.  A plumber who is an 
employee of a plumbing services company may have to work 
specific hours and follow specific protocols and procedures 
when repairing a leak or fixing a clog. 
The Martinez/IWC’s control test analyzes whether an 
employer controls the way a worker is paid, the hours worked, 
and the conditions of the work environment.  If an employer 
has significant or total control over these aspects of the work 
relationship, then the workers will be deemed to be an 
employee of the employer.  Thus, the same plumber used above 
would be an employee if the plumbing services company posed 
as an intermediary for payment but gives the plumber full 
autonomy over the rest of his job. 
Furthermore, the Martinez/IWC version of the “control” 
test does not require the plaintiff to demonstrate additional 
“secondary factors” of employment such as the Borello test.  
When applying the test, the Martinez court looked only at 
whether there was control over the wages, hours, or working 
conditions.156  The secondary factors played no role in 
determining whether the farming company was the employer 
of the harvesters.157 
The court contributes to the confusion between the two 
tests by not affirmatively stating which test is appropriate in 
determining the employment relationship.158  The Martinez 
court focused entirely on the wage order definitions and swiftly 
dismissed the Borello test when the plaintiffs raised an 
argument involving it.159  The court treats the two tests as if 
they were completely independent of one another.160 
Additionally, in both Martinez and Brinker, the court 
emphasizes the importance of the IWC wage orders and how 
 
 156.  Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 71–77. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 531. 
 159.  Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 73. 
 160.  Id. 
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much deference should be given to them.161  However, the 
courts do not state that the Borello test should no longer be 
considered in determining the employment relationship.162  
Furthermore, in Ayala, the court further adds to the confusion 
by acknowledging the two tests were separate from one 
another, yet refused to make a determination as to which one 
governs.163  These cases have caused confusion amongst the 
legal community.164 
Based off of the Ayala decision, the court appears to 
indicate that either test may be used to determine the 
employment relationship if both tests are applicable.  When an 
IWC wage order could apply to the type of work at issue, the 
wage orders apply.  If a wage order does not apply, then the 
common law Borello test would be applicable. 
The IWC wage orders and its statutory authority however, 
are applicable to all types of work.165  The seventeenth IWC 
wage order stated, “any industry or occupation not previously 
covered by, and all employees not specifically exempted . . . are 
covered by this order.”166  By using “all employees,” the wage 
order effectively brings every employee in the state of 
California under IWC jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the choice between the two tests is essentially 
a toss up.  Under the holding of Ayala, the courts will generally 
use the test that plaintiffs proceed under.167  This however, 
leaves defendants at the mercy of the plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs 
will pick and choose the test most beneficial to their case in 
hopes of securing a positive verdict.  This would create an 
unfair advantage for plaintiffs and would jeopardize the 
 
 161.  Id. at 61; Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1027. 
 162.  See Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 530. 
 163.  See Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 531. 
 164.  See Sue J. Stott & Jill L. Ripke, Perkins Coie, Wage Order—Not Borello—
Applies in Independent Contractor Status Test Says California Court of Appeal, 
PERKINS COIE (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.perkinscoie.com/en/news-insights/wage-
order-not-borello-applies-in-independent-contractor-status.html; Brian D. 
Lauter, 4 Years Later, Martinez v. Combs Still Confusing, L.  360, (Nov. 6, 2014), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/593266/4-years-later-martinez-v-combs-still-
confusing. 
 165.  See 8 C.C.R. § 11170(1)(A) (2014) (stating that all other unmentioned 
occupations fall under IWC jurisdiction). 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 522, 531 
(adjudicating under Borello test because plaintiffs proceeded solely on that basis).
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integrity of the judicial system. 
To solve this issue, it is important to analyze each aspect 
of the tests and see which test would most reasonably 
encompass the needs of the general public. 
A. The Borello Test 
Borello’s “right to control” test has been the common law 
rule in defining the employment relationship.168  However, the 
Borello test itself is not as broad in covering many different 
types of potential employment arrangements such as the 
Martinez/IWC test.  The test however, best addresses the issue 
of whether an individual is an employee or an independent 
contractor. 
“Employee” has been difficult for all courts and 
legislatures to properly define.169  A better approach would be 
to properly define what is not considered an employee, which 
in this case is an independent contractor.  The key word in the 
phrase “independent contractor” is “independent.”  Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines “independent” as “[n]ot subject to the 
control or influence of another.”170  An alternative definition is 
“[n]ot dependent or continent on something else.”171  The 
California codes also support this definition of independent.172  
Thus, if an individual works for another person but is subject 
to the control or influence of that person, that person is not an 
independent contractor and is therefore an employee.  The 
Borello test searches for this exact difference between the two 
classifications.173 
To safe guard against the abuse of this test, Borello 
inserted several secondary factors that could also find an 
employment relationship.174  At first blush, the list of factors is 
daunting.175  It could also be considered burdensome to go 
through one test followed by fourteen different factors in 
support of it.  However, these intertwining factors used 
together in unison allow courts to extend the reach of the 
 
 168.  Id. at 530–31. 
 169.  See, e.g., supra Parts I.B; supra I.C; supra I.E. 
 170.  Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at 116. 
 173.  S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 400. 
 174.  Borello, 48 Cal. 3d at 350–51. 
 175.  See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at Appendix. 
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Borello test or restrict it if an overwhelming amount of factors 
go against the “right to control.”  The test can reach the 
audiences it was designed to reach while still remaining 
reasonable.  The Borello test is still relevant and applicable 
despite the rulings in Martinez and Ayala. 
B. The Martinez/IWC test 
The Martinez/IWC test is a very broad and sweeping test.  
The test itself comprises of three “sub-tests” to define the 
employment relationship.176  Each one can define employee in 
its own mutually exclusive, though somewhat overlapping 
way.177  Generally, this broad sweeping test will swing in favor 
of workers in the general public because the test does not 
require the simultaneous satisfaction of all three tests.  
Because the test itself is comprised of three mutually exclusive 
sub-tests, it is important to look at each sub-test individually. 
1. Control Test 
As stated above, the control portion of the Martinez/IWC 
test might appear to be the same as the Borello “right to 
control” test.178  However, this control test looks more at how 
the employer is conducting their business with respect to the 
treatment and well-being of the person, the employee.179  The 
Borello test on the other hand looks more at the details of how 
the work is completed.180 
The Martinez/IWC control test looks to see if an individual 
has control over the wages, hours, or working conditions.181  
This could potentially reach employment arrangements that 
are designed by crafty employers to avoid the Borello test.  For 
example, if an employer pays a worker for any reason, they 
have satisfied the control test.182  If they set an employee’s 
hours of work, they have also satisfied the test.183  If they in 
any way have control over the employee’s working conditions 
 
 176.  See Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 64. 
 177.  See id.; Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575, 585. 
 178.  See supra Part III. 
 179.  See Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 64 (defining “employ” in consideration of the 
protections needed by the “vast majority” of the state’s workforce). 
 180.  See Borello, 769 P.2d  at 400. 
 181.  See Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 64. 
 182.  See id. at 74 (stating that a promise to pay an individual is an offer for 
employment). 
 183.  See id. at 48. 
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they have met the requirements of this test.184 
The result of this test however, could almost effectively 
eliminate the independent contractor from the state of 
California.  The control portion of the Martinez/IWC test 
contains mutually exclusive factors.185  The test requires 
control over the “wages, hours, OR working conditions,” not the 
“wages, hours, and working conditions.”186  This can create 
employment relationships in areas where independent 
contractors typically do business.  For example, a hairstylist 
performs services for customers in the privacy of their own 
home.  The hairstylist may set certain fees for specific tasks 
such as hair coloring or a perm, but is open to bargaining over 
the price.  The customer, a frugal and silver-tongued 
individual, talks the stylist into accepting an hourly amount 
for the service they are about to receive.  Has the hairstylist 
and the customer unwittingly established an employer/
employee relationship?  Money has been exchanged as a result 
of the service transaction, and the customer did have some 
level of control over the “wage” paid to the hairstylist.  The 
promise of a type of payment for work is considered by the 
California Supreme Court to be an offer of employment.187  
Typically, this would not be seen as an employee/employer 
relationship; however, the literal wording of the Martinez/IWC 
test instills doubt into this consideration. 
This type of exchange should not be seen as an employer/
employee relationship.  Common sense should dictate over 
these types of situations.  The customer has exhibited some of 
the factors of the Martinez/IWC control test, but such a short 
timeframe of work does not constitute statutory “employment.”  
If it did the customer would be required to obtain workers 
compensation coverage, pay for unemployment insurance, pay 
for social security benefits, and more.  The Martinez/IWC test 
broadly protects California workers, but should not have such 
far-reaching lengths.  Judicial or legislative action is required 
to prevent misuse of this sub-test. 
 
 184.  See id. at 48. 
 185.  See id. at 64. 
 186.  See id. 
 187.  Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 74. 
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2. To “suffer or permit to work” 
The phrase to “suffer or permit to work” is a second 
possible sub-test to satisfy in the Martinez/IWC framework.  
Similar to the control test, this phrase can be broad and 
encompass many types of potential employment relationships.  
Unfortunately, this sub-test appears to suffer from the same 
problems as the control sub-test of the Martinez/IWC 
framework.188  The test is broad, but can be too broadly 
encompassing. 
The phrase “suffer or permit to work” on its face appears 
to encompass any type of relationship where one party allows 
another party to engage in work for them.  By this standard, 
almost any type of exchange or simple service could be seen as 
satisfying this condition.  For example, if an elderly individual 
allows another person to assist them across the street, they 
have performed a simple service and the elderly individual 
permitted them to do so.  Nowhere in the text of this sub-test 
indicates a requirement of payment is necessary to satisfy it.189  
This interpretation of the “suffer or permit to work” subtest 
could create many unwitting employment relationships.  This 
could especially be a problem for those who take on volunteers 
or un-paid interns.  An employer could permit an interns or 
volunteers to work for them for no compensation and 
unknowingly open the door to potential liability.  There is no 
statutory limitation to this test and without any form of 
correction its reach is far too broad. 
3. To “engage, thereby creating a common law 
employment relationship” 
The last sub-test of the Martinez/IWC relationship also 
suffers from problems similar to the prior two sub-tests.  This 
phrase in it of itself is unhelpful, similar to the American 
Disability Act’s dead-end definition of “employer.”190  The first 
phrase “to engage” could be broadly interpreted similar to 
“suffer or permit to work” and the control test.191  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines employ as “to employ or involve oneself; to 
 
 188.  See supra Part III.B.1. 
 189.  See Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 64. 
 190.  See 42 U.S.C.S. § 12111 (2008) (defining “employee” as “individual 
employed by an employer.”) 
 191.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
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take part in; to embark on.”192  Based on this definition, the 
employment relationship appears to be created by the actions 
of the worker, not the employer.  This could cause issues where 
individuals attempt to force their services upon another.  For 
example, if an individual on the street approaches a vehicle 
stopped at a signal and begins cleaning the windows, the 
window cleaner may have forced an employment relationship 
upon the unwitting driver.  This certainly could not be what 
the IWC intended when it issued its wage orders or what the 
legislature or the public intended when they gave the IWC 
authority to promulgate such rules. 
Ideally, the second phrase of this sub-test, “creating a 
common law employment relationship,” could be interpreted as 
a link back to the previous common law test, Borello, to 
determine the employment relationship.  Martinez however, 
treated the two tests as exclusive of one another.193  Therefore, 
the test itself is circular, as it appears to reference the common 
law test of employment when the Martinez case itself appears 
to be the new common law standard of defining employment.  
This third sub-test of the Martinez/IWC test therefore spawns 
more questions, and gives little answers. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
A. Both Borello and Martinez/IWC Tests Should be 
Combined Together to Form the “Dominant Control 
Test” 
Both the Borello and Martinez/IWC tests reach a broad 
range of potential employment relationships.194  Each test 
however, has its strengths and weaknesses.195  Borello could be 
seen as narrower for giving so much weight to the “right to 
control” factor, but is supplemented by several additional 
intertwining factors for consideration.196  The Martinez/IWC 
test reaches broadly, but could create employer/employee 
relationships where none had previously existed.197 
If combined together, the two tests would amalgamate to 
 
 192.  Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). 
 193.  See Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 47. 
 194.  See supra Part III. 
 195.  See supra Parts III.A, III.B. 
 196.  See supra Part III.A. 
 197.  See supra Part III.B. 
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a test best suited for protecting the public without over 
including certain service arrangements.  The test is fairly 
exhaustive because it uses all the positive factors of each test 
and combines them together. 
The test begins with Borello’s right to control test would 
still be used as the highest weighted factor in determining the 
employment relationship.  It looks at the current situation of 
the employment agreement to determine if the employer has 
the right to control the employee’s work output.  Should this 
factor fail to find an employment relationship, the next step 
will be to use the Martinez/IWC tests to examine the work 
arrangement. 
The three sub-tests of Martinez/IWC are different from 
their predecessor because each sub-test will not be mutually 
exclusive of one another.  Now, this portion of the “dominant 
control” test requires only two of the three Martinez/IWC sub-
tests to be satisfied.  Thus, if an employer exercised control 
over the wages, hours, or working conditions of an employee 
and the employee has engaged in work with the employer, this 
portion of the “dominant control” test has been satisfied. 
Finally, the fourteen factors of the Borello test will be 
examined together to further conclude whether an employee/
employer relationship exists.  This relationship does not exist 
where the fourteen factors, under the totality of the 
circumstances, overwhelmingly push the scales in favor of no 
employee/employer relationship. 
This test of course has its downsides.  On its face, the 
original Borello test and its fourteen factors appeared to be a 
long and time-consuming process.  Judicial time and resources 
would be taxed even more by using the “predominate control 
test.”  Attorney’s fees for litigation and appeals would also 
increase, providing a burden on both plaintiffs and defendants.  
Furthermore, a great number of lower income plaintiffs would 
be hard pressed and to enter into an already expensive process 
of litigation if their attorneys had to engage in such a time 
consuming test.  This would go against the purpose of the test, 
which is to protect the very people who would be most 
susceptible to misclassification. 
B. The California Legislature/Industrial Wage 
Committee Should Affirmatively Define “Employ” 
Alternatively, the California legislature or the Industrial 
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Wage committee should act quickly and decisively define what 
constitutes the employment relationship.  The merits of either 
the Borello common law test or the Martinez/IWC common law 
test of employment could be made into a statute.  This would 
quickly and affirmatively help the courts and the legal 
communities decide which test is best used to determine the 
employment relationship. 
The downfall of this second proposal is the inability to 
change any potential additions without amendments to the 
law.  This would take additional legislative and/or executive 
branch resources to remedy.  It could also add further 
confusion if the present day tests are unable to account for new 
types of employment agreements in the future that are possible 
because of new technologies.198 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the misclassification of employees hurts 
workers, state and federal governments, and other competing 
businesses.199  To prevent misclassification, the judiciary needs 
to decide the most appropriate test for defining the employer/
employee relationship.  The recent decision in Dynamex has 
created confusion amongst the California legal community as 
to which of the Borello or Martinez/IWC tests are appropriate 
for determining what is an “employee.”200  Both tests have their 
strengths and weaknesses yet neither has been specifically 
endorsed by the California Supreme Court.201  After looking 
closely at both tests, a new and extremely detailed test should 
be employed to protect the public yet uphold the freedom of 
being an independent contractor.202  The “dominant control” 
test incorporates the benefits of both the Borello and Martinez/
IWC tests at the cost of consuming more time to conduct 
thoughtful analysis of each factor.203  Regardless of the costs, 
the “dominant purpose test” should be employed by California 
 
 198.  See e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., et al., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (regarding the classification of Uber drivers are employees or 
independent contractors.) 
 199.  See generally Carre & Wilson, supra note 2. 
 200.  See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. App. 4th 
718. 
 201.  See Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 64. 
 202.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 203.  See supra Part IV.A. 
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courts to prevent further harm to the state’s people, 
businesses, and economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
